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Stern v. Commissioner: Classification of the
Private Annuity Transaction
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the private annuity' has become a much discussed tax-planning device.2 The many tax and non-tax advantages of a private annuity make it a very attractive vehicle for
financial planning.3 Determining the appropriate tax classification
of the private annuity transaction is important in implementing its
successful use. A transfer of property in return for periodic payments may be classified as either a sale in consideration for an annuity ("sale") or a transfer in trust with income reserved ("transfer
in trust"). 4 The two possible classifications produce very different
tax consequences; 5 thus, the uncertainty of tax classification increases the risks associated with the private annuity.
Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enhanced the attractiveness of the private annuity by holding on the
taxpayer's side of the classification issue.6 In so holding, the court
narrowed the previously followed analysis of the private annuity
transaction 7 and elevated the form of the transaction over its
substance.8
After a brief discussion of the tax consequences of the different
classifications of a private annuity transaction, this note will review
the judicial history of classification of such transactions. Next, this
note will discuss the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the private annuity in Stern v. Commissioner9 and criticize the court's analysis and
holding. This note will conclude by suggesting an alternative ap1. See infra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
2. See Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectiveson SophisticatedEstate Tax A voidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 194 (1977).
3. See infra notes 22-69 and accompanying text.
4. See Mathison, LaFargue v. Commissioner: Using the Private Annuity as a Wealth
Transfer Device, EST., Girs & TR. J., July-Aug. 1983, at 14.
5. See infra notes 29-69 and accompanying text.
6. Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984).
7. See LaFargue v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1982); Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975); Samuel v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 682 (1st Cir.
1962); Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757 (1972).
8. Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1984) (Enright, J., dissenting);
Comment, Stern v. Commissioner: Who's In ControlHere?, 38 TAX LAW. 689 (1985).
9. 747 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'g 77 T.C. 614 (1981).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 17

proach for determining how any purported annuity transaction
should be classified.
II.

BACKGROUND

In an annuity transaction, one party, the annuitant, transfers
cash or other property to another, the payor, in return for the
payor's promise to make periodic payments.I° The amounts of the
payments usually are based on the annuitant's life expectancy and
the value of the property transferred." The payments are at specific intervals for life or for some stated period of time.I2 There are
several types of annuities including life annuities,' 3 temporary life
annuities," joint 6and survivorship annuities,' 5 and annuities with
refund features.1
A private annuity is simply an annuity paid by an individual or
company which normally does not pay annuities. 17 The private annuity arrangement generally involves related taxpayers, such as a
parent transferring property to a child in return for the child's
promise to make periodic payments.' 8
A transfer of property in exchange for periodic payments may be
classified for tax purposes as either a sale or a transfer in trust.' 9
10. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1976); see also Silberman v. United States, 333 F.
Supp. 1120, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Johnson, Latest Developments in the Tax Treatment
of Private Annuity Transactions, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1395 (1969).
11.

D. POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS

§

3.07 (1983).

12. See Stowe Township v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 363 F. Supp. 341, 343 (W.D. Pa.
1973).
13. A life annuity is an annuity for the lifetime of the purchaser. K. CLARK, TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES § 140 (1941); 4 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON,
FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, AND ESTATE TAXATION

§ 63.01 (1981).

14. A temporary life annuity is an annuity which is limited to a definite number of
payments (years) but which may pay less if the annuitant predeceases the termination
period; the payments under no circumstances continue after the annuitant's death. K.
CLARK, supra note 13, § 141, at 259.
15. A joint and survivorship annuity is an annuity which provides for payments to
continue for the longer of the life of the purchaser annuitant or the life of another person.
K. CLARK, supra note 13, § 25, at 32; J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 13, § 63.03.
16. An annuity with a refund feature is an annuity which assures the return of a
specified sum of money, paid to the annuitant during his life or to his estate should he die
early. K. CLARK, supra note 13, § 28, at 35; J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, supra note 13,

§ 63.02.
17. See Ekman, Utility of Private Annuities in Estate Planning, 27 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 421, 422 (1969); Phillips, PrivateAnnuities in Estate Planning, 52 TAXES 50, 50
(1974).
18. Cohen, Recent Developments in the Taxation of PrivateAnnuities, 16 MAJOR TAX
PLAN. 491, 491-92 (1969); see Cooper, supra note 2, at 193; Peschel, New Developments in
Estate Planning, 28 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 1, 8 (1976).
19. See Mathison, supra note 4, at 14.
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There is, in theory, a clear difference between a sale, in which the
taxpayer transfers property outright in exchange for periodic payments, and a transfer in trust, in which the taxpayer transfers property subject to the right to receive the income from that property.2"
Nevertheless, the many similarities between the sale and the transfer in trust frequently generate disputes between the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") and taxpayers regarding the proper
classification of particular transactions.21
A.

The Differing Tax Treatments of the Sale
and Transfer in Trust
The annuitant-transferor achieves several tax and non-tax benefits from a sale in consideration for a private annuity. The sellerannuitant secures a steady flow of funds for the remainder of his
life while being relieved of the burden of managing the transferred
assets. 22 Moreover, the child of the seller-annuitant can acquire
immediate title to the assets on a deferred payment basis if the
child is the buyer-payor. 23 The more tangible benefits of the properly structured sale in consideration for a private annuity, however,
come in the form of reduced income,24 gift25 and estate taxes.26
The transferor loses these tax benefits if the IRS succeeds in classifying the transaction as a transfer in trust with the right to income
reserved.27
28
1. Income Tax Consequences

Pursuant to section 72 of the Internal Revenue Code (the
20. Mathison, supra note 4, at 14.
21. See infra notes 72-163 and accompanying text.
22. See Dale, Foreign Trusts Now Offer ParticularEstate PlanningAdvantages, 36 J.
TAX'N 20, 20 (1972); Zaritsky, The Use of Private Annuities in Estate Planning:
Problems, Opportunities, and a Viable Alternative, 32 S.C.L. REV. 359, 359-60 (1980).
23. Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 TAX L. REV. 469, 577-79
(1975); Zaritsky, supra note 22, at 359-60.
24. Ekman, Private Annuities Revisited, 8 INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 74-11 (1975);
Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 577-79; Kanter, New Decisions Delineate Tests for Foreign
Situs Trust-Private Annuity Transactions, 38 J. TAX'N 82, 82-83 (1973); see infra notes 2939 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
26. Kanter, supra note 24, at 82; see infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 40-48, 56-59, 68-69 and accompanying text.
28. To understand the importance of a transaction's classification, it is necessary to
understand the tax consequences of each classification. This discussion focuses only on
the tax consequences to the annuitant, not the buyer-payor. For a more complete
analysis, see Mathison, supra note 4, at 14-16; Midgley, Federal Income Taxation of
Private Annuitants, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679 (1972); Zaritsky, supra note 23, at 360-
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"Code") 29 and Revenue Ruling 69-74,30 an annuity payment is divided into a capital portion and an annuity portion. 3 The capital
portion is further divided into tax-free return of basis32 and taxable
capital gain.33
The return of basis is tax-free since the annuitant simply is getting back a portion of the value of the property that was trans29. I.R.C. § 72 (West 1985).
30. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43. Prior to this ruling, the taxation of private
annuities was controlled by Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53.
A revenue ruling represents the conclusions of the Internal Revenue Service on the
application of the law to the facts involved. Statement of Procedural Rules
§ 601.201(a)(6). A Revenue Ruling follows in importance behind the Code itself and the
Treasury Regulations. Rev. Rul. 64-22, 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 689; J. CHOMMIE, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 13-14 (2d ed. 1973).
31. I.R.C. § 72 (West 1985); Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, 44.
32. Basis is defined as the cost of property. I.R.C. § 1012 (West 1985). An "exclusion ratio" is employed to calculate the amount of the annuitant's return of basis. I.R.C.
§ 72(b) (West 1985). The exclusion ratio is calculated by dividing the annuitant's investment in the annuity contract by his expected return from the annuity. I.R.C. § 72(b), (c)
(West 1985). This figure then is multiplied by the amount of each annuity payment, and
the result is the tax-free return of basis. I.R.C. § 72(b) (West 1985).
For example, if $10,000 is invested in an annuity and the expected return is $40,000,
the exclusion ratio is 25%:
exclusion rate = investment in annuity contract = $10.000 = 25%
expected return from annuity
$40,000
If the amount of each annuity payment is $2,000, the tax-free return of basis is $500
($2,000 x 25%).
"Investment in the [annuity] contract" is defined as the amount paid for the annuity
contract, less any amounts received under the contract before the annuity starting date.
I.R.C. § 72(c)(1) (West 1985). The "expected return" is equal to the annuitant's life
expectancy multiplied by the amount of each annual payment. I.R.C. § 72(c)(3) (West
1985). Life expectancies are found in the tables in Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, T.D. 6500
(1960).
The exclusion ratio applies even if the taxpayer lives beyond his life expectancy; the
taxpayer can continue to exclude a portion from his income despite having recovered his
initial capital investment. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4(a)(4) (1975); D. POSIN, supra note 11, at
§ 3.07. If a taxpayer dies early, however, he is not allowed a deduction for his unrecovered basis. Rev. Rul. 72-193, 1972-1 C.B. 58.
33. The capital gain portion of each annuity payment equals the present value of the
expected return from the annuity less the annuitant's adjusted basis in the property transferred in exchange for the annuity, divided by the annuitant's actuarial life expectancy.
Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
The present value of a sum due in a certain number of years in the future at a given
interest rate is the amount which, if it were on hand today, would grow to equal the
future sum. E. BRIGHAM, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 68 (3d ed.
1983). Present value factors for annuities are determined in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10(f)
(1984). The "adjusted basis" for determining gain (or loss) from the sale or other disposition of property equals the cost of the property, I.R.C. § 1012 (West 1985), adjusted for
expenditures, receipts, losses and other items properly chargeable to capital account (e.g.,
amortization, depreciation and obsolesence). I.R.C. §§ 1011(a), 1016 (West 1985). Life
expectancy tables are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, T.D. 6500 (1960).
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ferred in exchange for the annuity payments.34 The capital gain
portion, on the other hand, represents the appreciation in value
between the date on which the annuitant acquired the property and
the date on which the property was transferred to the payor of the
annuity.35 The capital gain portion generally is taxable at a rate
lower than that applied to ordinary income.36
The annuity portion of the periodic payment is calculated by
subtracting the capital portion from the total payment. 37 The annuity portion is taxable as ordinary income because it represents
interest income. 38 Thus, the taxpayer who sells property in exchange for an annuity may avoid any income tax on the return of
basis and may also defer payment of taxes, both on capital gains
resulting from the transfer and on ordinary interest income, until
he receives the annuity payments.39
None of these benefits are available to the taxpayer who transfers
property in trust but reserves the right to receive income from that
property. Under the grantor trust provisions of the Code,40 such a
transferor is treated as the continuing owner of the trust property 4 '
and thus is taxed on income from the property as if he had never
transferred it.42 Since this type of transfer is regarded as a mere
change in the form of the transferor's wealth,4 3 there is no return of
basis or capital gain involved in the transaction.
The grantor trust provisions reflect Congress' concern that taxpayers were evading taxes by transferring assets to trusts while re34. See supra note 32.
35. See supra note 33.
36. If the property transferred in exchange for the annuity has been held for more
than six months, 60% of the net capital gain is deducted from the annuitant's gross
income. I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1222 (West 1985).
37. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, 44.
38. I.R.C. § 72 (West 1985).
39. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357,
358-59 (3d Cir. 1949); Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164, 173-74 (D.N.J. 1944); J.
Darsie Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936); see supra notes 32-33.
40. I.R.C. §§ 671-678 (West 1985). These provisions are referred to as the grantor
trust provisions because they treat the grantor of the trust as the owner of the trust
corpus under certain circumstances. See infra notes 41-42, 45-48 and accompanying text.
41. See I.R.C. § 677 (West 1985) ("[T]he grantor [of a trust] shall be treated as the
owner ... of a trust ... whose income ... is, or ... may be ... (1) distributed to the
grantor ... [or] (2) held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor.
42. See I.R.C. § 671 (West 1985), which provides in relevant part:
Where it is specified that the grantor [of a trust] shall be treated as the owner of
any portion of a trust, there shall then be included in computing the taxable
income and credits of the grantor ... those items of income, deduction, and
credit against tax of the trust which are attributable to that portion of the trust.
Id.; see also Mathison, supra note 4, at 13.
43. See Mathison, supra note 4, at 14.
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taining substantial dominion and control over the assets or the
income therefrom." Thus, the Code treats the grantor of the trust
as the continuing owner of the trust property if he has retained the
power to control beneficial enjoyment of the trust corpus,45 the
power of administration over the trust,46 the power to revoke the
trust agreement and reacquire the trust property,47 or the right to
have trust income distributed to him.48
2.

Gift Tax Consequences

The properly structured sale in exchange for an annuity also
provides gift tax advantages to the transferor-annuitant. If the
present value 49 of the annuity promise is equal to or greater than
the fair market value of the assets transferred, no gift tax 5° liability
will be created by the exchange.5 ' On the other hand, if the present
value of the annuity promise is less than the fair market value of
the assets transferred, a taxable gift may result to the extent of the
44. See Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 167 (1942) (citing S. REP. No. 665, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1932)); Phipps v. Helvering, 124 F.2d 288, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(citing S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1932); H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1924)); infra
notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
45. I.R.C. § 674 (West 1985) ("The grantor [of a trust] shall be treated as the owner
of a trust [if] the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the income therefrom is subject to
a power of disposition ... without the approval or consent of any adverse party.").
46. I.R.C. § 675 (West 1985). Section 675 provides in relevant part:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in respect of
which(1) A power.., enables the grantor to purchase, exchange, or otherwise deal
with or dispose of the corpus or the income therefrom for less than an adequate
consideration ....
(2) A power.., enables the grantor to borrow the corpus or income ...
without adequate interest or without adequate security....
(3) The grantor has.., borrowed the corpus or income and has not completely repaid the loan, including any interest, before the beginning of the taxable year. ...
(4) A power of administration is exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity by
any person without the approval or consent of any person in a fiduciary
capacity.
47. I.R.C. § 676 (West 1985) ("The grantor [of a trust] shall be treated as the owner
of a trust ... where at any time the power to revest in the grantor title ... is exercisable
by the grantor or a non-adverse party or both.").
48. I.R.C. § 677 (West 1985); see supra note 41.
49. See supra note 33.
50. Sections 2501-2524 of the Code are the general provisions controlling the gift tax.
The gift tax is a tax imposed on the transfer of property by gift by an individual. I.R.C.
§ 2501 (West 1985).
51. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (West 1985).
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disparity.52 The transferor also will incur gift tax liability if the
annuity payments are payable to someone other than the transferor,5 3 or if the actuarial life expectancy used in determining the
annuity payments5 4 is deemed excessive.5 5
Although the transferor of assets in trust with income reserved
continues to be treated as the owner of the assets under the grantor
trust provisions, 56 a taxable gift nevertheless will result to the extent that the value of the assets transferred exceeds the value of the
interest retained by the transferor.5 7 Thus, a gift to the remaindermen of the trust will result whenever the present value5" of the
periodic payments that the transferor will receive is less than the
value of the assets transferred.59
3.

Estate Tax Consequences

A carefully structured sale will not create any estate tax' liability.6' Once assets are transferred to the annuity payor, they cease
to be part of the transferor's gross estate. 62 Thus, if the terms of
the annuity do not include a refund 63 or survivorship 64 feature and
if the annuity payments terminate upon the death of the annuitant, 6 5 no amount of the annuity will be included in the annuitant's
gross estate. 66 Even if the sale is shown to have been made in con52.
53.

See Rev. Rul. 76-491, 1976-2 C.B. 302 (a private annuity treated as a taxable gift).
Croft & Hipple, PlanningLifetime Property Transfers: Private Annuities, Installment Sales and Gift-Leasebacks, 11 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 253, 262-63 (1976). See
Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 40 B.T.A. 475 (1939); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (1983).
54. See supra notes 32-33.
55. Estate of Lion v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
870 (1971); Estate of Butler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 914, 919 (1952); cf Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 504 F.2d 586, 590-91 (7th Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul.
80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 66-307, 1966-2 C.B. 429; Zaritsky, supra note 22, at
368 (requiring the annuitant's actual life expectancy to be used if the annuitant is terminally ill; the life expectancy tables, see supra notes 32-33, are inapplicable).
56. I.R.C. § 677 (West 1985); see supra notes 41, 48 and accompanying text.
57. See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512-5(a)(1)(i) (1984), 25.2512-9(a)(I)(i) (1984).
58. See supra note 33.
59. See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2512-5(b), (d), (f) (1984), 25.2512-9(b), (d), (f) (1984);
Mathison, supra note 4, at 15.
60. Sections 2001-2210 of the Code are the general provisions for the estate tax. The
estate tax is "a tax imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a
citizen or resident of the United States." I.R.C. § 2001 (West 1985).
61. See Mathison, supra note 4, at 16; Zaritsky, supra note 22, at 369.
62. See Mathison, supra note 4, at 16.
63. See supra note 16.
64. See supra note 15.
65. See supra notes 13, 15.
66. See I.R.C. § 2039 (West 1985); Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1 (1976). The value of a
decedent's gross estate is determined by including the value at the time of his death of all
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templation of death, no estate tax liability will follow if the value of
the property transferred equals the value of the annuity promise
received.67
On the other hand, the Code includes in a decedent's gross estate
the value of any property which the decedent during his lifetime
transferred for less than full and adequate consideration if he retained a right to the lifetime possession or enjoyment of the property or retained the right to designate who should receive
possession or enjoyment of the property and income therefrom.68
Thus, if a transaction is classified as a transfer in trust with income
reserved, the assets transferred will be included in the gross estate
of the transferor and will be subject to estate taxes.6 9
B.

Reclassication in the Courts

The tax consequences of classifying a particular transaction as a
sale in exchange for an annuity or a transfer in trust with income
reserved demonstrate the importance of determining the category
in which a particular transaction belongs. A determination of the
appropriate classification may be difficult, however, because the
difference between a sale and a transfer in trust, in form, sometimes
is so slight that even minimal modification of the purported annuity agreement may lead to unexpected and unwanted results.70
Therefore, in order to secure the tax benefits of a private annuity, a
transferor-annuitant must meticulously structure the annuity
transaction or risk a complete reversal of the tax consequences he
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated. I.R.C. § 2031(a)
(West 1985); see also infra note 67.
If the terms of the annuity provide a refund or survivorship feature, or if the payments
were to continue for a period which did not in fact end before the annuitant's death, then
the decedent's gross estate will include the value of the survivor's annuity corresponding
to the proportionate share of the purchase price contributed by the decedent. I.R.C.
§ 2039(a), (b) (West 1985). Under § 2056, if this amount is paid to a surviving spouse, it
will qualify for the estate tax marital deduction, which allows a surviving spouse to deduct from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of the property
passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse. I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1985).
67. Under § 2035 of the Code, a decedent's gross estate, see supra note 66, includes
property which the decedent transferred, to a trust or otherwise, during the three-year
period preceeding his death, I.R.C. § 2035(a) (West 1985), unless the transfer was a bona
fide sale for adequate and full consideration. I.R.C. § 2035(b)(1) (West 1985).
If property transferred in exchange for an annuity exceeds in value the annuity promise, the difference can be taxed as a gift made in contemplation of death if the transaction
was completed within three years prior to death. Croft & Hipple, supra note 53, at 26263.
68. I.R.C. § 2036 (West 1985).
69. See id.; Mathison, supra note 4, at 15.
70. Croft & Hipple, supra note 53, at 260-61.
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seeks to obtain. 7
Cases in which the IRS has challenged private annuity transactions illustrate the difficulty of classifying these arrangements. The
decisions have not been consistent in their rationales or in their
holdings. Instead, each court of appeals opinion seems to offer a
different test for classification of such transactions.
1. Samuel v. Commissioner
In Samuel v. Commissioner,72 the taxpayer transferred valuable
documents, which later became known as the "Dead Sea
Scrolls," 73 to a trust of which he became co-trustee.74 The original
trust agreement provided that all of the income and ninety percent
of the principal of the trust were to be disposed of at the taxpayer's
discretion, that the taxpayer would retain full power to amend and
revoke the trust, and that the trustees would have broad powers to
deal with the trust corpus. 75 The trust agreement later was
amended to provide for annual payments to the taxpayer, from income or principal, as determined by the trustees.76
In the first three years of the trust, no income was earned on the
trust assets 77 and no distributions were made to the taxpayer. 71 In
the fourth year of the trust, the scrolls were sold by the trustees
and the trust reported income, but the taxpayer still did not receive
annual payments. 79 Finally, in the fifth and sixth years of the trust,
the taxpayer began to receive his annual payments. 80 The IRS re71. See Ginsburg, supra note 23, at 578-79 (warning that "it is poor planning to have
as the buyer (issuer of the annuity contract) a trust, and particularly one established for
the benefit of anyone who is a natural object of the seller's bounty," for the transaction is
at risk of being reclassified).
72. 306 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1962).
73. Id. at 683. The taxpayer, while serving in the Middle East, purchased the scrolls
for $15,000. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 683-84. The trustees were granted the power to buy, hold, sell, exchange,
and lease all types of real and personal property, and to allocate to income and capital all
trust receipts and trust expenditures. Id. at 684.
76. Id. The amendment provided a $15,000 reimbursement for taxpayer's expenses
and an additional $15,000 for his expected future expenses. Id. Additionally, a $10,000
annual payment, payable from income or principal at the trustee's discretion, was to be
made to the taxpayer. Id.
77. Id. There was no income because the corpus for the trust consisted solely of the
scrolls. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The scrolls were sold for $250,000 and the trust reported income of
$3,794.37. Id. The taxpayer, however, received his two $15,000 payments as reimbursement for expenses. Id.; see supra note 76.
80. Id. The trust in these years reported income of $8,541.75 and $10,315.31. Id.
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jected the taxpayer's contention that he had sold the scrolls to the
trust, and instead reclassified the transaction as a transfer in trust
with income reserved.81
The First Circuit held that while the formal documents purported to create a trust,8 2 the court would not hesitate to look beyond the formalities of the transaction and, where warranted,
attribute to the grantor the tax consequences of a reserved enjoyment of income.83 The court stated that in the normal annuity situation, in which the annuitant has transferred property to the
obligor-payor in return for a contractual right to periodic payments, the annuitant is unconcerned with the ultimate disposition
of the property transferred. 4 By contrast, the taxpayer in Samuel
had retained effective control of the property transferred to the
trust.8 5 The court therefore concluded that the transaction should
have been classified as a transfer in trust with reserved interests.8 6
The First Circuit thus developed a practical control test for determining a particular transaction's classification: a transfer of assets in exchange for periodic payments is a sale only if the
purported annuitant has relinquished so many incidents of ownership that it may no longer be said that he has effective control over
the property transferred; if the transferor retains effective control,
the transaction is properly classified as a transfer in trust with reserved interests.8 7
81. Id. at 685.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 688.
84. Id. at 687.
85. Id. The court stated that under § 677 of the Code, it is enough if the income of
the trust may be held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor. Id. at 686
(citing Helvering v. Evans, 126 F.2d 270, 272-73 (3d Cir. 1942); Greenough v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1934)) (emphasis added).
86. Samuel, 306 F.2d at 687.
87. Id.; see also Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757 (1972), in which the taxpayers
established several trusts, initially funded with $1,000 by a nominal settlor, and transferred stock to them in return for a lifetime annuity. Id. at 767. The trust agreement
included provisions delineating the distribution of income and the power of the trustee to
lend money to the beneficiaries of the trust, the taxpayers, on an unsecured, interest-free
basis. Id. Further, the trust agreement established an advisory committee, directed by
the taxpayers, which had plenary power over the trust assets, including the power to
manage and invest the trust estate and the power to veto virtually any act of the trustee
affecting the estate. Id. The agreement also limited the trustee's liability for performing
any act in accordance with the direction of the advisory committee. Id.
The Bixby court found that the entire transaction was designed to allow the taxpayers
to maintain control of the transferred assets and the income therefrom while they were
claiming the benefits of a private annuity. Id. at 789. The court, relying on Samuel,
found the taxpayers' maintenance of control over the transferred assets crucial in determining the transaction's classification, and articulated a practical test for determining the

1986]

Stern v. Commissioner

2. Lazarus v. Commissioner
In Lazarus v. Commissioner,88 the Ninth Circuit and the Tax
Court considered several factors other than the degree of the taxpayer's control in determining whether a transfer should be classified as a sale or a transfer in trust. In Lazarus, the taxpayer had
established a trust, named his children and other relatives as beneficiaries and reserved in himself the right to replace the trustee.8 9
The taxpayer then entered into an annuity agreement by which he
transferred stock in a shopping center to the trust in exchange for
the trustee's promise to pay him $75,000 a year. 90 Thereafter, the
trustee sold the stock to a third party in exchange for a non-negotiable promissory note for $1 million with annual interest payments
of $75,000. 91 The IRS reclassified the purported annuity agreement as a transfer in trust with income reserved.92
Both the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit stressed that the taxpayer was entitled to adopt any tax plan which, by any legal
means, would decrease or avoid altogether the amount of taxes he
otherwise would owe. 93 Both courts held that the substance and
not the form of a transaction should determine how the transaction
is treated for tax purposes 94 and that a series of related transactions
degree of control the transferor retained over the transferred property. Id. at 789. If the
purported annuitant transferred so many incidents of ownership that it could be said that
he no longer had effective control over the property, then the transaction properly could
be classified as a sale; otherwise, the annuitant should be treated as the grantor. Id.
Applying this test, the court held that the taxpayers were grantors taxable on the income
of the trust because they were able to direct the trust's investments, borrow from the trust
without security or interest, appoint themselves as "voting trustees" and vote the stock
that they had transferred to the trust, and direct the advisory committee. Id. at 790-91.
88. 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'g 58 T.C. 854 (1972).
89. Lazarus, 513 F.2d at 825-26. The taxpayer's right to replace the current trustee
was limited in that the replacement trustee had to be an independent corporate fiduciary
and the eldest living beneficiary had to consent to the replacement. Lazarus, 58 T.C. at
857. The taxpayer did exercise this right to replace the trustee. Lazarus, 513 F.2d at 826.
90. Lazarus, 513 F.2d at 826.
91. Id. The taxpayer's attorney participated actively in the sale. Id. The taxpayer
did not report the annual payments as income because he calculated his exclusion ratio to
be 100%. Lazarus, 58 T.C. at 859; see supra note 32.
92. Lazarus, 58 T.C. at 863-64. The IRS also claimed deficiencies on the theory that
the taxpayer never relinquished control of the shopping center and was therefore taxable
on the net rental income from the leases during the years at issue. Id. at 862.
93. Lazarus, 513 F.2d at 828; Lazarus, 58 T.C. at 864 (citing Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935)).
94. Lazarus, 513 F.2d at 828-29; Lazarus, 58 T.C. at 864 (citing Commissioner v.
P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1958)). The Tax Court stated that this is true
"unless it appears from an examination of the statute that form is to govern." Lazarus, 58
T.C. at 864. The Tax Court noted that "annuities and trusts.., are easily susceptible to
manipulation so as to create illusion." Id.
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must be considered together and not in isolation.95 Examining the
annuity agreement, the trust instrument, and the non-negotiable
promissory note, the Tax Court found that trust characteristics
clearly predominated, despite the fact that the instruments were
cast in the form of a sale in exchange for an annuity.96
The court based its decision upon a "totality" of several circumstances, all of which were characteristic of a transfer in trust rather
than an arm's-length sale. 97 The taxpayer's $75,000 annual payment was equal to the interest payments that the trust was to receive from the non-negotiable note, the trust's only incomeproducing asset. 98 Moreover, because the annual payments were to
come from the note's interest, the trust corpus would remain intact
and the full $1 million principal would pass to the taxpayer's children and other relatives, just as it would have passed had the transaction been cast as a transfer in trust with a retention of income. 99
The initial transfer from the taxpayer to the trust did not include a
down-payment, security, or interest on the deferred purchase price,
although such terms are normally found in a bona fide arm'slength sale. 10 Finally, there was no relationship between the shopping center's value and the purported purchase price of the annuity; 0 1 normally, an arm's-length sale is not made for a fraction of
the transferred property's value. In a transfer in trust, however, no
relationship need exist between the value of the retained interest
10 2
and the transferred property's value.
95. Lazarus, 513 F.2d at 829; Lazarus, 58 T.C. at 864; see also Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1938); Kanawha Gas & Utilities Co. v. Commissioner,
214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954).
96. Lazarus, 58 T.C. at 867.
97. Id. at 867-69.
98. Id. at 867.
99. Id. at 867-68.
100. Id. at 868.
101. Id. The court noted:
Payments to annuitants are, in fact, based upon mortality tables which purport
to reflect a rate of return sufficient to enable the annuitant to recover his cost
and in addition thereto a low rate of return on his investment." ... It is well
known that an annuity is calculated to yield a recipient who lives out his expectancy a total amount equal to the consideration paid, plus interest thereon....
Id. at 869 (citations omitted) (quoting George H. Thornley, 2 T.C. 220, 229 (1943), rev'd
on othergrounds, 147 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1945)); see also Glenn E. Edgar v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 717, 742-43 (1971); J. Giltner Ingelhart, Sr. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 766, 76970 (1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1949); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-1(c)(1) (1956).
102. Lazarus, 58 T.C. at 868-69.
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3. LaFargue v. Commissioner
In LaFarguev. Commissioner,103 the Ninth Circuit continued to
emphasize factors other than control in determining the proper
classification of a purported annuity transaction. The taxpayer's
investment plan included two steps: creation of a trust °4 and execution of a contract under which the taxpayer exchanged stock and5
0
other assets for the trustee's promise to make annual payments.
The terms of the trust agreement granted the taxpayer a limited
power of appointment 0 6 over the trust assets. 0 7 The annuity
agreement stated that no security was given for the annual payments and that no interest factor was involved. 0 8 The administration of the trust was lax; the annual payments were all late, yet no
penalty was assessed, and the taxpayer, not the trust, continued to
receive the dividends because the transfer agent was not notified
about the stock transfer. 0 9
The Tax Court concluded that the substance of the transaction
was the creation of a trust which reserved to the grantor the right
to annual payments.I" The court found it significant that without
the transferred property, the trust would have been an empty
shell"' and that this property was the only source of petitioner's
payments." 2 The court also noted that no relationship existed between the present value of the annual payments and the fair market
103. 698 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'g 73 T.C. 40 (1979).
104. LaFargue,73 T.C. at 43. Taxpayer created a trust, with nominal corpus, for her
daughter's benefit. Id. at 42-43. As trustees she chose her sister, a family friend, and her
attorney. Only the attorney had any experience in trust administration. Id. at 43.
105. Id. Pursuant to the agreement taxpayer transferred assets worth $335,000 in
exchange for annual payments of $16,502. Id. at 43, 46-47.
106. A power of appointment is the power to select the person or persons who are to

receive the corpus or income of the trust. G.
TRUSTEES § 264.20, at 432 (rev. 2d ed. 1977).

BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND

107. LaFargue, 73 T.C. at 44.
108. Id. at 47. Because the annuity was calculated without an interest factor, the
actuarial value of the annual payments was significantly less than the value of the property transferred. Id. at 55-56.
109. Id. at 48. For the first three years, no payments were made on time. Id. The
annuity payments were due annually on June 1. In 1971, the payment was received on
September 1; in 1972, on December 29; and in 1973, on July 6. Id. A late payment
penalty provided for in the agreement never was assessed. Id. The dividends were not
recorded by taxpayer as income on her individual returns but were instead reported on
the fiduciary tax return. Id.
110. Id. at 53. The court viewed the series of related transactions as a whole and
based its conclusion on the totality of the circumstances, rather than any one decisive
factor. Id.
111. Id. at 53-54.
112. Id. at 54.
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value of the transferred property, 13 that no interest factor was
used in calculating the deferred payments," 4 and that the taxpayer
viewed herself as the beneficial owner rather than as a creditor of
the trust."'5
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that classification as a sale
was consistent with the formal structure of the transaction and an
accurate reflection of its substance. 1 6 Noting the absence of a direct correlation between the annual payments and the trust income,"' the court held that it could not disregard the formal
structure of the transaction as a sale absent an indication that the
annuity agreement was a mere disguise for transferring the income
of the trust to the grantor." 8 The court concluded that since the
fundamental transfer and annuity obligations of the contract had
been met and the taxpayer had relinquished control over the transferred property, the transaction was a sale." 9
113. Id. at 54-55. The present value of the annuity payments equalled $176,990 and
the fair market value of the property was $335,000. Id. This disparity is uncharacteristic
of an arm's-length sale or exchange. Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 868 (1972),
aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975).
114. LaFargue, 73 T.C. at 55. This is also uncharacteristic of a sale in exchange for
an annuity agreement. Id.; see also Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 869 (1972),
aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975).
115. LaFargue, 73 T.C. at 56-57. The court based this finding on the manner in
which the property was administered, which included the taxpayer's continued receipt of
the dividends from the transferred stock, her failure to assess the penalty for late payments, and her right to be included at meetings held to discuss the administration of the
trust. Id.
116. LaFargue, 689 F.2d at 846-47.
117. Id.; see supra note 98 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit distinguished
Lazarus,see supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text, on the grounds that its rationale
simply could not apply to this annuity arrangement since the fixed annuity payments
were not a conduit for the income of the trust. LaFargue, 689 F.2d at 848. "The payment simply did not represent a camouflaged transfer of trust income." Id. at 849. The
court did find that here, as in Lazarus, the property transferred constituted the bulk of
the trust assets. Id. However, in LaFargue the trust corpus was assessable for payment
of the annuity while in Lazarus the corpus was not assessable. Id. (citing Lazarus v.
Commissioner, 513 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1975); Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854,
870-71 (1972)).
118. LaFargue, 689 F.2d at 846-47. The court noted, "Had [the grantor] taken an
active role in trust investment decisions or held some power to manage the trust or control the trustees, we might apply the rationale of Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757
(1972), or Samuel v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1962)." Id.; see supra notes
72-87 and accompanying text.
119. LaFargue, 689 F.2d at 848-49. For Tax Court decisions which in essence have
followed LaFargue while stating no opinion as to its validity, see Estate of Fabric v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 932 (1984); Benson v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 789 (1983).

Stern v. Commissioner

1986]

III.

STERN V. COMMISSIONER

A.

Facts

In Stern v. Commissioner,12 ° the Ninth Circuit again considered
whether a complex annuity transaction should have been reclassified. Seeking certain tax benefits, 12 ' taxpayers Sidney and Vera
Stern decided to transfer stock to a foreign situs trust in exchange
for a private annuity.122 The Stems instituted their plan by having
an acquaintance act as settlor to establish an irrevocable trust for
the benefit of the Stems and their children.1 23 Although the settlor
contributed funds to the trust, the overwhelming124majority of the
value of the trust was contributed by the Stems.
The trust agreement authorized the trustee to lend money to the
beneficiaries, the Stems and their children, on an unsecured, inter1 25
est-free basis, and to distribute trust income or corpus to them.
The taxpayers retained a power of appointment over the trust
fund 26 and the power to remove the trustee without cause.1 27 The
1 28
annuity agreement required the trust to make annual payments
regardless of the value of the property held and the amount of income produced. 129 The trustee's liability, however, was limited to
the value of the trust assets; once these assets were exhausted, the
trustee was no longer obligated to make further payments. 130
Sidney Stem made several suggestions regarding the investment
decisions of the trust."'3 The trustee approved one such suggestion
and invested $25,000 in a company which was to be owned and
120. 747 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'g 77 T.C. 614 (1981).
121. See supra notes 29-69 and accompanying text.
122. Stern, 77 T.C. at 616.
123. Id. at 617-18.
124. Id. at 617-18, 621. The settlor and his law firm invested $5,100 (expecting to
generate future business for the firm), while the Sterns contributed approximately
$2,950,000 (this equals the number of shares of stock they transferred, multiplied by the
value of the stock on the day of the transfer). Id.
125. Stern, 77 T.C. at 620.
126. Id. at 619. The power of appointment was limited by the trust agreement in that
it could not be exercised in favor of the donee, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of
his estate. Id. at 619 n.9.
127. Id. at 619. The trust agreement required the successor trustee to be a company
empowered to administer trusts and having authorized capital of at least $100,000 in
Bahamian currency. Id. at 619 n.10.
128. Id. at 622. The annuity payments were $222,757.01 and $27,216.85 to Sidney
and Vera respectively. Id. at 621. These figures were obtained by dividing the fair market value of the stock transferred by the appropriate annuity factor found in Estate Tax
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10(f) (1984). Stern, 77 T.C. at 621-22.
129. Stern, 77 T.C. at 622.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 632-33.
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operated by Mr. Stern. 1 32 In connection with this investment, Sidney Stern applied for a broker's license, which required the filing of
a personal financial statement.1 33 On this statement Mr. Stem included among his personal assets stock previously 34transferred to
the trust, but he made no mention of any annuity.
Mr. Stem also selected a new investment company to advise the
trustee.1 35 When this investment company decided to sell all the
stock originally transferred to the trust, it obtained an attorney's
opinion letter regarding the ramifications of such a sale under the
securities laws.' 36 This letter indicated Sidney Stem's and the
trustee's belief that Mr. Stern, and not the trust, owned the
stock.' 37 Mr. Stern later terminated the investment company's
services after it failed to follow his advice.' 3s Further, when Mr.
Stern became displeased with the trustee's reporting, documenta39
tion and fees, he removed the trustee and substituted another.1
B.

The Tax Court

The Tax Court upheld the IRS's reclassification of the Stem's
transactions as a transfer in trust with income reserved." 4 The
court stated that in classifying a particular transaction, a delicate
balance exists between the taxpayer's right to arrange his affairs to
minimize his taxes and the requirement that a transaction's substance rather than its form must control its tax consequences."'
The court considered several factors in rejecting the Stem's contention that they had sold assets in exchange for an annuity contract.
The court found that the trust's creation and the annuity agreement were integral parts of a prearranged plan, neither of which
132. Id. at 625-28.
133. Id. at 626.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 630-32. The taxpayer interviewed Stephen Weiss, of Weiss, Peck & Greer,
questioned him extensively about his firm's qualifications to manage the trust, and thereafter sent a letter indicating his approval of Weiss, Peck & Greer as the investment advisor. Id.
136. Id. at 632.
137. Id. The letter stated, "You have been assured by Mr. Stern and [the trustee] ...
that neither ... has sold or attempted to sell any of the shares ... connect[ed] with this
acquisition." Id.
138. Id. at 632-34. The concerns he expressed included the desire to preserve the
trust corpus while producing sufficient income to service his annuities. Id. at 632-33.
139. Id. at 634.
140. Id. at 640.
141. Id. at 639.
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would have been executed without the other. 142 It concluded that
the economic results of the transactions, including transfer of the
remainder of the trust to the natural objects of the taxpayers'
bounty, could have been achieved through a transfer with a reserved right to payments equal to the calculated annuity amounts
rather than by selling the property to the trust. 14 3 The court also
noted that the assets transferred by the Stems to the trust and the
income derived therefrom were the only sources of funds for the
annual payments.' 44
The court stated that the trust terms giving Mr. Stern the indicia
of ownership demonstrated that he had retained an interest in the
transferred assets. 45 According to the court, the Sterns were assured of receiving the value of any appreciation, because they were
the beneficiaries of the trust, they had a power of appointment enabling them to dispose of trust corpus, and they had the power to
remove the trustee without cause.' 46 The court found that the
Sterns had participated in the trust investment decisions and had
claimed to be the owners of the trust property when it benefited
them. 147 Finally, the court noted that the attorney's opinion letter,
which stated that Sidney Stern had not sold any of the stock, indicated that Mr. Stern viewed himself as a beneficial owner rather
than as a creditor of the trust property. 148 The court concluded
that an overall consideration of these factors, no one of which was
annuity transaction as
controlling, supported reclassification of the
49
a transfer in trust with income reserved.
C. The Court of Appeals
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that
this case was "on the taxpayer's side of the line" because the transaction lacked a connection between the amount of the annuity and
the trust income, and because the Stems did not possess the degree
of control necessary for the court to disregard the formal structure
142. Id. at 640-41. "[T]he consideration exchanged for the 'annuities' constituted the
corpa of the newly created trusts." Id. at 641.
143. Id. at 641.
144. Id. at 641-43. "[T]he nexus between the payments and the transferred properties creates in the transferor a continuing interest in those properties. This is uncharacteristic of a sale and annuity arrangement wherein the annuitant generally assumes
the role of a creditor."
145. Id. at 642.
146. Id. at 642-43.
147. Id. at 643-44.
148. Id. at 645.
149. Id. at 645-46.
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of the transaction and reclassify it as a transfer in trust with income reserved. 50 The court pointed out that under the provisions
of the trust, it was the trustee, not the taxpayers, who controlled
the investment of the trust assets.' 5 ' Although Mr. Stern gave his
advice, it was rarely followed, and when it was followed, it involved only an insignificant investment amount. 52 The court held
that these minor informalities did not justify disregarding the formal structure of the transaction "because the fundamental transfer
and annuity obligations were being met and the 'taxpayer
had relin53
quished control over the property transferred."'
D. The Dissent
The dissenting judge believed that the majority had elevated the
form of the transaction over its substance' 54 and that the Stems
possessed control and beneficial enjoyment sufficient to support
reclassification.' 55 The dissenter's conclusion that the Stems retained sufficient control was based on several factors. The dissent
noted that the Stems has the power to remove the trustee without
cause and to appoint a new one, 56 that Mr. Stern continued to give
57
advice and make proposals which were followed by the trustee, 1
and that Mr. Stern selected and later terminated the trust's investment company. 158
The dissent also stated that the Stems faced none of the risks
normally borne by annuitants. 159 For example, the risk of early
death, usually present in an annuity, 16° was not present since the
residue of the trust was held for the benefit of the Stems and their
heirs; the Stems had nothing to lose.' 6' Thus, according to the
dissent, it made little difference to the Stems whether the accumulated value of their annuity payments approximated the fair market
value of the stock transferred. 62 The dissent therefore found that
150. Stern, 747 F.2d at 558, 560.
151. Id. at 559.
152. Id. The investment totaled only $25,000 while the assets of the trusts were over
$4.3 million. Id. at 559 n.8.
153. Id. at 560.
154. Id. at 561 (Enright, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 561-63.
156. Id. at 562.
157. Id. at 561.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Mathison, supra note 4, at 14-15.
161. Stern, 747 F.2d at 562-63 (Enright, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
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the Stems would be classified more
appropriately as beneficial
63
owners than as seller-annuitants.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Courts have relied upon several factors in deciding cases in
which the taxpayer asserts that an annuity transaction is a sale in
exchange for an annuity while the IRS asserts that the transaction
is a transfer in trust with income reserved. The decisions all stress
that these factors are to be considered as a whole; no factor alone is
to be decisive. 164 Courts have considered the following factors important: the relationship between the creation of the trust and the
property transferred to it, 165 the similarity between the amount of
income generated by the transferred property and the amount of
annuity payments, 166 the source of the annuity payments, 167 the degree of the annuitant's control over the transferred property, 68 the
nature and extent of the annuitant's continuing interest in the
transferred properties,' 69 and the arm's-length nature of the annuity arrangement. 70
Beginning with LaFargue, however, courts began limiting the
range of determinative factors.' 7 1 In Stern, the Ninth Circuit restricted these factors even further. The court's rationale focused
on the formal documents, the lack of a tie-in between the trust
income and the annual payments, and the degree of control the
Stems were held to possess. In determining the impact of these
factors, the Court overemphasized the form of the transactions and
underemphasized their substance. The decision appears to sanc163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Stern v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 614, 640 (1981), rev'd, 747 F.2d 555
(9th Cir. 1984); LaFargue v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 40, 53 (1979), rev'd, 689 F.2d 845
(9th Cir. 1982); Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 867 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824
(9th Cir. 1975).
165. LaFargue v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 40, 53-54 (1979), rev'd, 689 F.2d 845 (9th
Cir. 1982); Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 866 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th
Cir. 1975).
166. Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 867-68 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th
Cir. 1975).
167. Id. at 868.
168. Samuel v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 682, 687 (1st Cir. 1962); Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 789-90 (1972).
169. LaFargue v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 40, 54 (1979), rev'd, 689 F.2d 845 (9th Cir.
1982); Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 866 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.
1975).
170. Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 868-69 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th
Cir. 1975).
171. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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tion a method of improper tax avoidance. 172 The court thus ignored the Supreme Court's warning that an examination of the
facts, in light of economic realities, should not be frustrated by
overemphasizing "technical considerations, niceties of the law of
trusts or conveyances, or
the legal paraphernalia which inventive
73
genius may construct."'1
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's finding that there
74
was no tie between the annuity payments and the trust income.1
The court of appeals acknowledged, however, that the absence of a
connection is not conclusive. 75 The presence of a tie-in may justify
the classification of the transaction as a transfer in trust, but in the
absence of a tie-in, further analysis is needed. ' 76 LaFargue suggests
that if a taxpayer has the ability to control the trust assets or the
trustee, a court may reclassify an apparent sale as a transfer in
trust. 177

The Stern court concluded that the Sterns did not retain a de178
gree of control sufficient to justify reclassifying the transaction.
The court held that the trust provisions granted the trustee, not the
taxpayers, control over the trust assets.' 79 The trustee's control,
however, was merely "on paper." The Sterns' power to remove the
trustee without cause gave them the real control. 180 If the trustee
refused to follow their wishes, they could replace him with someone who would. The power to replace a trustee without cause has
been held tantamount to possessing the powers of the trustee and
thus control of the trust.' 8 ' When one combines the unlimited
power to replace the trustee with the Sterns' investment advice, the
trustee's limited ability and its authority to lend money to the
172. Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1984) (Enright, J.,
dissenting).
173. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 854, 864 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975).
174. Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1984); 77 T.C. 614, 641-42
n.49.
175. Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing LaFargue v.
Commissioner, 689 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1982)).
176. Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing LaFargue v.
Commissioner, 689 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1982)).
177. LaFargue v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1982).
178. Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1984).
179. Id.
180. See Coming v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 907, 915 (1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 646 (6th
Cir. 1956).
181. Id. (the trustee is likely to be predisposed to follow the wishes of the holder of
such a power, for if he does not, the holder of the power can remove him and appoint
another trustee); see also Van Beuren v. McLoughlin, 262 F.2d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 991 (1959); Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325.
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Stems on an unsecured and interest-free basis, the Stems' absolute
control over the trust corpus becomes apparent.
In holding that the Stems did not retain sufficient control to justify reclassification, the court gave too little weight to the fact that
the trustee followed Mr. Stem's advice and invested $25,000 into a
financial company which was to be owned and operated by Mr.
Stem. 8 2 The court found the amount of the investment insignificant. 183 This transaction was important, however, not because of
the amount involved but because it demonstrated that the trustee
would follow Mr. Stern's advice. In fact, the trustee later followed
his advice in much more significant transactions-the selection and
eventual termination of investment counsel for the trust. 184 It was
more than mere coincidence that the trustee took advice so willingly; Mr. Stem merely was exercising the control that he had in
fact retained.
The Ninth Circuit also held that the Stems had relinquished
control over the property transferred despite certain informalities
in the trust administration.' 85 These informalities included Mr.
Stem's listing the transferred common stock among his personal
assets and the attorney's letter stating that Mr. Stern had not sold
any of the stock. 86 While these statements alone may not have
been conclusive, they became damaging admissions when considered along with the other indicia of the Stems' retention of control.
The taxpayers transferred control of their assets on paper, but
their overall economic situation in fact had not changed. The
Stems could have used the assets after the transfer as before, had
they wanted or needed them. The Stems had the power to make
sure that their desires would be followed by choosing a trustee who
would act in accordance with their wishes.' 87 The trustee could, at
the Stems' request, lend them money on an unsecured, interest-free
basis.' 8 The taxpayers' money was "secure" because the Stems
and their children were the beneficiaries of the trust. 8 9 They could
take the money now or later when they wanted or needed it because as beneficiaries all the money would inure to them anyway.
182.
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184.
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Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555, 559 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1984).
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See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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Further, it did not matter that the value of the payments was not
equal to the value of the transferred property 90 because, as beneficial owners of the trust, the Stems in effect were selling to
themselves.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Stern, by limiting the factors
considered and stressing the form of the transaction over its substance, will lead to unwarranted and unexpected results which
Congress attempted to avoid when it enacted the grantor trust provisions. '9 ' The Stern decision makes it easy to circumvent the congressional desire to prevent evasion of taxes through trusts which
effectively distribute their income for the use or benefit of the grantor.192 The holding permits exactly what Congress was trying to
prevent: a grantor retaining practical control over assets transferred to a trust while reaping the advantageous tax consequences
of classifying the transaction as a sale in exchange for an annuity.
The Stern holding sends out the wrong signal to those who possess the means to circumvent their tax responsibilities. 193 A taxpayer who wants the tax benefits of a sale' 94 along with the control
of a transfer in trust with income reserved 95 can achieve both
under the Stern rationale. Those taxpayers who can afford to hire
a clever tax planner can have their private annuity transaction
clothed with all of the formal indicia of a sale, and, while not outwardly showing control, can make sure that they will be able to
control the assets through indirect mechanisms. When Congress
enacted the grantor provisions of the Code, 196 it sought to prevent
197
exactly this type of "form-over-substance" manipulation.
V. ALTERNATIVE
When determining the proper classification of a transfer in exchange for periodic payments, the courts should start with an examination of the formal documents. If the provisions of the trust
agreement expressly give the taxpayer reversionary interests," s the
power to control the beneficial enjoyment of the trust corpus or
190. Id. at 617-18, 621; see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
192. Id.
193. Stern v. Commissioner, 747 F.2d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 1984) (Enright, J.,
dissenting).
194. See supra notes 29-69 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 40-41, 45-48 and accompanying text.
197. See Kaplan v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 401, 402 (1st Cir. 1933); supra note 44
and accompanying text.
198. See I.R.C. § 673 (West 1985).
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income,' 99 administrative powers,2 " or the power to revoke the
trust, 20 1 then the transaction should be classified as a transfer in
trust with reserved income. Under the grantor trust provisions, a
grantor who retains these interests or powers is taxed as if he had
never relinquished ownership of the trust assets.20 2 Given the importance of retention of control in the determination of whether a
"sale" has occurred,20 3 courts should be guided by the grantor
trust provisions in deciding classification cases.
If the formal documents do not, by their terms, give the taxpayer
reversionary interests or powers of control, the courts should then
analyze the substance of the documents' provisions in a manner
which recognizes their true economic reality. 2°4 The relationship
between the trust income and the amount of the periodic payments
may be determinative. 20 5 If a direct correlation exists between
trust income and the amount of the periodic payments, then the
''annuity" arrangement is nothing more than a conduit for the
trust income and the transaction should be classified as a transfer
in trust with income reserved.2 °6
If no such correlation exists, the courts should consider whether
the taxpayer can control the trust cgrpus or the actions of the
trustee. 2 7 The courts should analyie whether the taxpayer retained an interest in the trust (other than as a direct creditor), 08
whether the transaction was at arm's length, 2 9 and whether the
trust has any substance beyond the property which the taxpayer
transferred to it. 210 If analysis of all these factors leads to the conclusion that the taxpayer is "disinterested," then, and only then,
should the transaction be classified as a sale and the taxpayer allowed to reap the concomitant tax benefits.
199. See I.R.C. § 674 (West 1985); supra note 45.
200. See I.R.C. § 675 (West 1985); supra note 46.
201. See I.R.C. § 676 (West 1985); supra note 47.
202. See supra notes 40-43, 45-47 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 168, 177-81 and accompanying text.
204. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1958); Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
205. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1958); Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940).
206. See Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 867 (1972), aff'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th
Cir. 1975).
207. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The courts are faced with a difficult task when they are asked to
reclassify a private annuity transaction. They must contend with
taxpayers asserting their rights to arrange their affairs in any legal
manner they desire and with the IRS asserting that the taxpayers
have not, through their transactions, changed their economic situations enough to justify different tax treatment. The Stern court
tilted the scale towards the taxpayer by considering only a narrow
range of factors and by emphasizing form over substance. The
court allowed taxpayers to obtain all of the benefits of a sale without the tax burdens of a transfer in trust with income reserved.
Such an outcome runs contrary to the congressional desire, codified in the grantor provisions of the Code, to prevent a taxpayer
from evading taxes by transferring assets to a trust whose corpus
and income is really at the disposal of the taxpayer.
The courts should reject Stern in favor of an analysis which first
examines whether the "annuity" agreement is a mere vehicle for
transferring the income of the trust. If the court finds the annuity
to be nothing more than a conduit for trust income, the transaction
should be classified as a transfer in trust. If the court finds that the
annuity was not a mere conduit, it should analyze the formal documents of the transaction to determine whether the taxpayer has
expressly retained control. If the annuitant has retained control
over the transferred property, the transaction should be classified
as a transfer in trust. If the documents do not reveal a clear retention of control, the court must examine the substance of the transaction to determine whether the annuitant has retained control
through indirect mechanisms. Again, if the annuitant has retained
control, the transaction should be classified as a transfer in trust.
Finally, the court should examine whether the annuitant is "disinterested," that is, whether the transaction was at arm's length,
whether the trust itself has any substance beyond the property
which the taxpayer transferred to it, and whether the taxpayer has
retained any continued interest in the trust other than as a mere
creditor. If the taxpayer is found to be disinterested, the transaction should be classified as a sale.
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